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STATE V. BROWN:  A TEST FOR LOCAL FOOD 
ORDINANCES 
Ryan Almy* 
I.  SPROCKET 
For many of us, adding a little milk to our morning coffee is likely one of the 
more insignificant tasks of the day.  For Dan Brown of Blue Hill, Maine, that 
splash of dairy in his coffee mug is the result of his personal labor and constant, 
meticulous attention paid to the health and well-being of a single 1,000-pound 
mammal.1  Besides fresh raw milk, what does Brown gain from his efforts?  He 
knows the exact source of the milk he puts in his coffee, as well as the butter his 
daughter spreads on her toast: Sprocket, Brown’s sole dairy cow.2  However, 
Sprocket has garnered Brown some unwanted attention recently, earning her a new 
moniker: “Troublemaker.”3   
Whatever dairy Sprocket produces that does not end up in the Brown family’s 
coffee or cereal, Dan Brown offers for sale directly from his farm, Gravelwood 
Farm, or at local farmers’ markets in the towns of Blue Hill and nearby Ellsworth.4  
These sales, “which net Brown roughly $8,”5 gained the attention of the Maine 
Department of Agriculture (“the Department”).6  
The Department, noting that Brown was not properly licensed as either a milk 
distributor or food establishment, advised him that he was not in compliance with 
state law and demanded that he cease the sale of all food products until he 
complied with licensing requirements, or otherwise face legal action.7  
Furthermore, having previously taken samples from Brown’s raw whole milk, 
butter, and cottage cheese, the Department claimed that his dairy products “failed 
to meet established standards for quality and safety,” and that Brown was 
“exposing consumers to serious health risks.”8  Despite these demands and threats 
of legal action, Brown continued to sell his food products without a Department 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, 2014, University of Maine School of Law.  I would like to thank Professor 
Sarah Schindler and the Maine Law Review editors and staff for their invaluable contributions and 
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 1. Kevin Miller, Maine’s Case Against a Blue Hill Farmer and His Cow Gains National Attention, 
BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Dec. 27, 2011, http://bangordailynews.com/2011/12/27/news/hancock/maines-
case-against-a-blue-hill-farmer-and-his-cow-gains-national-attention. 
 2. Id.  
 3. Id.  
 4. Id.; see also Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 18-19, State v. Brown, ELLSC-CV-11-70 (Me. Super. Ct., Han. 
Cty., filed Nov. 3, 2011). 
 5. Miller, supra note 1.  “Altogether, Sprocket produces about a gallon and a half of milk per day,” 
sale of which gains Brown roughly $8.  Id.  Brown offers other food products for sale at his farm stand 
and at farmers’ markets, including jams, jellies, maple syrup, and canned vegetables.  Pl.’s Opp’n to 
Def.’s Comb. Mot. Summ. J. & Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. 2, Brown, ELLSC-CV-11-70 (Me. Super. 
Ct., Han. Cty., filed Nov. 3, 2011). 
 6. See Pl.’s Compl., supra note 4, ¶¶ 18-25. 
 7. See Pl.’s Ex. E, Brown, ELLSC-CV-11-70 (Me. Super. Ct., Han. Cty., filed Nov. 3, 2011). 
 8. Id.  
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license recognizing him as an authorized distributor or food establishment.9 
On November 3, 2011, the State of Maine filed suit against Dan Brown in 
Hancock County Superior Court “seeking injunctive relief and civil penalties for 
violations arising out of the unlicensed distribution and sale of milk and food 
products . . . .”10  Subsequently, both parties moved for summary judgment, with 
Brown claiming that Maine’s “home rule” provisions, combined with the recently 
passed Local Food Ordinance in Blue Hill,11 exempt him from state licensing 
requirements.12   
The suit against Dan Brown has gained the attention of raw milk advocates, 
pro-family farm interest groups, bloggers, and “locavores” across the nation.13  
Gary Cox, general counsel for the Farm-to-Consumer Legal Defense Fund,14 and a 
familiar face in litigation involving “food sovereignty” and small family farms, has 
signed on to defend Brown in the matter.15  While gaining significant national 
attention as fuel to the fiery food choice debate, the “Farmer Brown” case came to 
a rather anticlimactic end when the Hancock County Superior Court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the State and issued an injunction against Brown, 
enjoining him from selling raw milk or otherwise operating a food establishment 
unlicensed.16  A hearing regarding civil penalties is pending as this Note goes to 
press.17 
The Superior Court found summary judgment in favor of the State appropriate 
as “Brown readily concedes that he has sold and continues to sell milk . . . without 
a license,” and such unlicensed conduct could not be deemed permissible as a 
                                                                                                     
 9. Pl.’s Compl., supra note 4, ¶ 22-25. 
 10. Id. at ¶ 1. The complaint alleges three counts, one of which—Count II, regarding labeling 
requirements—is not within the scope of this Note. 
 11. Blue Hill, Me., Local Food and Community Self-Governance Ordinance of 2011 (Apr. 1, 2011) 
[hereinafter Blue Hill Local Food Ordinance].  See also Rich Hewitt, Blue Hill Voters Approve Self-
Governance Ordinance, $1.7 Million Budget, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Apr. 3, 2011, 
http://bangordailynews.com/2011/04/03/news/hancock/blue-hill-voters-approve-self-governance-
ordinance-1-7-million-budget. 
 12. Def.’s Comb. Mot. Summ. J. & Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. 12, Brown, ELLSC-CV-11-70 
(Me. Super. Ct., Han. Cty., filed Nov. 3, 2011).  Brown cited additional grounds for summary judgment 
that are outside the scope of this Note.  He claims substantial compliance with labeling requirements, 
and claims that the State should be estopped from arguing that he needs a license to sell raw milk due to 
his reliance upon the State’s practice of not requiring dairy farmers who do not advertise or solicit sales 
to obtain a license.  Id. at 4-6.  Brown claims that only under a recent re-interpretation of the laws 
pertaining to the state’s dairy program are such small farmers required to obtain a license.  Id. at 6-7.  
 13. See, e.g., David Gumpert, Maine Farmer’s Food Sovereignty Suit Appears Headed for Court 
Test, as Raw Milk Safety Rears its Head, THE COMPLETE PATIENT (Apr. 18, 2012, 7:24p.m.), 
http://www.thecompletepatient.com/article/2012/april/19/maine-farmers-food-sovereignty-suit-appears-
headed-court-test-raw-milk-safety; We Are All Farmer Brown!  Defend Community Food Sovereignty in 
Maine!, FAMILY FARM DEFENDERS, (Nov. 14, 2011), http://familyfarmers.org/?p=542. 
 14. See Board of Directors, FARM-TO-CONSUMER LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, 
http://www.farmtoconsumer.org/board.html (last visited Mar.11, 2013). 
 15. See David Gumpert, Maine Food Sovereignty Prosecutors: If Private Food Sales are Allowed, 
Why, There'll Be . . . There'll Be . . . There'll Be . . ., THE COMPLETE PATIENT (Aug. 9, 2012, 3:26 PM), 
http://thecompletepatient.com/article/2012/august/9/maine-food-sovereignty-prosecutors-if-private-
food-sales-are-allowed-why. 
 16. State v. Brown, ELLSC-CV-11-70 at 9 (Me. Super. Ct., Han. Cty., Apr. 27, 2013) (Murray, J.). 
 17. Id. 
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matter of law.18  The court relied on –an interpretation of state legislative intent that 
that dairy products should be subject to stricter regulation than other food items to 
dislodge Brown’s arguments based in Blue Hill’s Local Food Ordinance and 
Maine’s home rule provision.  In so doing, the court has functionally precluded a 
municipality from exempting individuals from milk licensing requirements.19  The 
court found such apparent legislative intent in the fact that Maine’s food 
establishment regulations already anticipate an exception for farm stand or farmers’ 
markets sales, and expressly exclude the sale of milk from such relaxed standards.20  
Thus, the court reasoned, reading the Local Food Ordinance as permitting Brown’s 
unlicensed sale of milk would render the ordinance implicitly preempted as it 
would clearly frustrate the purpose of existing state law.21  Further, the court cited 
the home rule “axiom” that “a municipality may only add to the requirements of the 
statute,” and may not loosen such requirements absent express authority to do so.22 
Interestingly, the Superior Court stopped short of striking down the Blue Hill 
Ordinance entirely, by adopting a reading of the ordinance that, in conformity with 
Maine’s existing regulatory scheme, offers exceptions for farm stand and farmers’ 
markets sales while retaining a ban against unlicensed dairy product sales.  
This Note will explore the background of the Brown case, address the 
arguments on each side of the dispute, and explore the potential ramifications of the 
Superior Court’s decision.  Part II will set the stage for the “food rights versus 
consumer protection” debate that is at the heart of Brown.  Part III will explore 
Maine’s constitutional and statutory scheme through which municipalities find the 
authority to enact local rules and address the stated purposes of the Local Food 
Ordinance.  Part IV will explore Maine’s regulation of food and agriculture, and 
the State’s purpose in standardizing the production and sale of food.  Part V will 
propose an alternate analysis of the issues in Brown, and argue that the Hancock 
County Superior Court could have recognized the validity of the Blue Hill Local 
Food Ordinance on grounds that agricultural policy should not be driven purely by 
the state’s definition of “safe” food, but also by concerns for the vitality of small-
scale local food producers and rural economies, as anticipated by Maine’s 
agricultural regulatory scheme.  Part VI will conclude by arguing that, despite the 
Superior Court’s ruling, Brown will potentially speak volumes as to the role of 
agriculture in Maine and what we value about it, and thus demands a full hearing 
on the merits.   
II.  HEATING UP 
The debate over raw milk is playing out across the nation through courtroom 
litigation and family farm raids.23  For example, in October 2009, Eric Wagoner 
was en route back to Georgia from South Carolina with 110 gallons of raw or 
                                                                                                     
 18. Id. at 3. 
 19. Id. at 8-9. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 9. 
 23. See generally DAVID E. GUMPERT, THE RAW MILK REVOLUTION:  BEHIND AMERICA’S 
EMERGING BATTLE OVER FOOD RIGHTS xxi, 1-16 (2009). 
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unpasteurized milk that had been ordered by his “virtual farmers’ market” 
customers.24  Upon reaching the Georgia border, Wagoner’s truck was stopped, 
searched, and seized by Georgian officials.25  The dairy contraband was embargoed 
and eventually destroyed, apparently by order of the FDA.26  Though the service is 
based in Georgia, where the sale of raw milk products is illegal, Wagoner’s virtual 
farmers’ market offered its members raw milk produced by various dairies located 
in neighboring South Carolina, where the sale of raw milk is legal.27  
The Farm-to-Consumer Legal Defense Fund, a non-profit organization 
“dedicated to protecting and promoting sustainable, environmentally sound farming 
practices and direct farm-to-consumer transactions” by defending “the right of 
farmers to directly provide, and for consumers to directly obtain, unprocessed and 
processed farm foods,”28 brought suit against the FDA and the Department of 
Health and Human Services on behalf of Wagoner, as well as other buyers and 
sellers of raw milk.29  It claimed that FDA regulations requiring milk to be 
pasteurized and banning unpasteurized milk from interstate commerce infringes 
upon consumers’ fundamental right to “produce, obtain, and consume the foods of 
choice for themselves and their families . . . .”30  The government responded that 
“there is no ‘deeply rooted’ historical tradition of unfettered access to foods of all 
kinds,” and denied the existence of  a fundamental right to personal bodily and 
physical health that includes the right to choose which foods to obtain and 
consume.31  Citing the public health concerns posed by raw milk, the FDA argued 
that regulations upon raw milk are reasonable measures in furtherance of 
safeguarding the national food supply.32 
The FDA requires pasteurization33 before milk is fit for human consumption—
indeed, milk must be pasteurized before it is properly recognized as “milk.”34  Raw 
milk proponents, on the other hand, counter that milk is a safe, nutrient-rich 
                                                                                                     
 24. Farm-to-Consumer Legal Def. Fund v. Sebelius, 734 F. Supp. 2d 668, 676 (N.D. Iowa 2010). 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. at 676, 689.  
 27. Id. at 676 
 28. Id. at 677.  
 29. Other plaintiffs included individuals who reside in states that have banned the sale of raw milk, 
purchase raw milk for their personal consumption in states where the sale of raw milk is allowed, then 
transport the raw milk to their home state for consumption, and a South Carolina farmer who produces 
and sells raw milk, some of which is purchased by people living in states in which the sale of raw milk 
is prohibited.  Id. at 675.  
 30. Id. at 678. 
 31. Br. in Supp. of United States’ Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Am. Compl. at 26, Sebelius, 734 F. Supp. 2d 
668 (No. 5:10-cv-04018-MWB). 
 32. Id. at 7-8, 27-29. 
 33. Pasteurization is a process where milk is heated to a specific temperature for a set period of 
time, thereby killing harmful bacteria that are known to cause diseases such as listeriosis, typhoid fever, 
tuberculosis, diphtheria, and brucellosis.  FDA, THE DANGERS OF RAW MILK: UNPASTEURIZED MILK 
CAN POSE A SERIOUS HEALTH RISK 1 (August 2012), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/ResourcesForYou/consumers/ucm079516.htm.  
 34. 21 C.F.R. § 131.110(a) (2012) (defining “milk” as “the lacteal secretion, practically free from 
colostrum, obtained by the complete milking of one or more healthy cows” that “shall have been 
pasteurized or ultra-pasteurized”). 
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beverage in its unadulterated, raw form.35  They argue that raw milk contains 
higher levels of essential vitamins, minerals, and healthy bacteria than pasteurized 
milk,36 and provides plentiful health benefits, including increased resistance to 
allergies and asthma.37 
However, battles over raw milk may only be symptomatic of the underlying 
war that is intensifying in the United States.38  At the heart of the raw milk debate 
is the individual’s asserted right to choose which foods to eat and feed his or her 
family, “even if in some cases it means assuming some minimal risk of becoming 
ill,” and the inevitably adverse interest of the State to define and regulate which 
foods are proper for human consumption in the name of public safety.39  This is the 
debate over what has been called food choice, or “food sovereignty.”40  As 
consumers are increasingly demanding locally produced foods41 and more of a 
connection with their food and its origins,42 safety regulations that arguably limit 
the consumer’s ability to obtain food products of their choice are seen by some as 
tantamount to restrictions upon the exercise of a fundamental right.43 
Providing the latest food choice battleground is the “Local Food Ordinance,” 
which has been passed by municipalities in Vermont,44 Massachusetts,45 
California,46 and Maine.47  These local ordinances assert that “citizens possess the 
                                                                                                     
 35. See A Campaign for Real Milk, The Weston A. Price Fund., A Campaign For Real Milk 
Brochure (Jan. 1, 2000), http://www.realmilk.com/brochures/real-milk-brochure. 
 36. See id. 
 37. Georg Loss et al., The Protective Effect of Farm Milk Consumption on Childhood Asthma and 
Atopy: The GABRIELA Study, 128 J. ALLERGY CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY 766, 769 (2011).  
 38. See GUMPERT, supra note 23, at xxvi-xxix. 
 39. See id. at xxvii.  See also Sebelius, 734 F. Supp. 2d. at 677-78; Br. in Supp. of United States’ 
Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Am. Compl., supra note 31, at 26. 
 40. See GUMPERT, supra note 23, at xxvii (quoting Pete Kennedy of the Farm-to-Consumer Legal 
Defense Fund); What Is Food Sovereignty?, FAMILY FARM DEFENDERS, 
http://familyfarmers.org/?page_id=230 (last visited Oct. 12, 2012). 
 41. See generally Dawn Thilmany McFadden, What Is Driving Consumer Demand for Local 
Foods? (Feb. 2012), (available at http://www.slideserve.com/sancha/what-is-driving-consumer-demand-
for-local-foods-dawn-thilmany-mcfadden-colorado-state-university). 
 42. See Marne Coit, Jumping On the Next Bandwagon: An Overview of the Policy and Legal 
Aspects of the Local Food Movement, 4 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 45, 49-50 (2008). 
 43. See Kammi L. Rencher, Note, Food Choice and Fundamental Rights:  A Piece of Cake or Pie in 
the Sky?, 12 NEV. L.J. 418 (2012); JOEL SALATIN, EVERYTHING I WANT TO DO IS ILLEGAL:  WAR 
STORIES FROM THE LOCAL FOOD FRONT 3-10 (2007) (questioning the rationale behind strict regulation 
on a number of agricultural activities). 
 44. See Jessica, Second Vermont Town Passes Food Sovereignty Measure, VT. COAL. FOR FOOD 
SOVEREIGNTY (May 17, 2011), http://vermontfoodsovereignty.net/2011/05/second-vermont-town-
passes-food-sovereignty-measure. 
 45. See Clarke Canfield, Food Sovereignty Ordinances:  Towns Loosen Reins On Direct-To-
Consumer Food Producers, HUFFINGTON POST (June 22, 2012, 3:10 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/22/food-sovereignty-ordinances_n_1618270.html. 
 46. See Rady Ananda, Santa Cruz Adopts Food Freedom Resolution Supporting Private Herd 
Shares, THEPEOPLESVOICE.ORG (Sept. 22, 2011, 8:20 PM), 
http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2011/09/22/santa-cruz-adopts-food-freedom-
resolutio. 
 47. Third Maine Town Passes Landmark Local Food Ordinance:  Effort Gaining Attention 
Nationwide, FARM-TO-CONSUMER LEGAL DEFENSE FUND (Apr. 4, 2011), 
http://www.farmtoconsumer.org/Third-Maine-Town-Passes-Landmark-Local-Food-Ordinance.htm. 
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right to produce, process, sell, purchase, and consume local foods of their 
choosing,”48 and thereby purport to exempt local food producers and processors 
from state license and inspection requirements, “provided that the transaction is 
only between the producer or processor and a patron when the food is sold for 
home consumption.”49  Furthermore, the ordinance rejects as unlawful any state or 
federal interference with the rights asserted.50   
The validity of the Local Food Ordinance is now under fire in the wake of the 
Brown decision.51  Facing sanctions from the Maine Department of Agriculture for 
selling unpasteurized milk without a license, Blue Hill farmer Dan Brown sought 
safe harbor under the town’s ordinance.52  Significantly, though it involves the sale 
of raw milk, the Brown case is not about the controversial dairy product.  This is, 
however, a case that goes to the heart of the food sovereignty debate.  It is a case 
about residents of a small, rural Maine town asserting the right to obtain food from 
their local farmers and neighbors unimpeded by state and federal regulation.  This 
is also a case about the State’s legitimate interest in regulating the sale of milk—
pasteurized or unpasteurized—and other food products through licensing and 
inspection, as a reasonable means of ensuring public health and safety.  As a 
potential “test case” for the legitimacy of local lood ordinances in general, the 
ultimate disposition and persuasiveness of Brown could have a profound impact on 
the food sovereignty movement in Maine, and nationwide.53 
III.  “FOOD SOVEREIGNTY”:  FINDING VALIDITY OF LOCAL FOOD ORDINANCES 
THROUGH “HOME RULE” PROVISIONS 
Maine’s State constitution affords “[t]he inhabitants of any municipality . . . 
the power to alter and amend their charters on all [local matters].”54  Thus, Maine is 
a “home rule” state, and grants its municipalities a plenary power to exercise, by 
ordinance or otherwise, any constitutionally granted power or function not 
expressly or implicitly denied by the Legislature.55  Thus, so long as not expressly 
or implicitly prohibited from doing so, a municipality is “free to act to promote the 
well-being of its citizens.”56 
                                                                                                     
 48. LOCAL FOOD AND COMMUNITY SELF-GOVERNANCE ORDINANCE OF 2011 § 5.2 (2011), 
available at http://savingseeds.files.wordpress.com/2011/03/localfoodlocalrules-ordinance-template.pdf 
[hereinafter Model Local Food Ordinance]. 
 49. Id. § 5.1. 
 50. Id. § 6.1. 
 51. Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Comb. Mot. Summ. J. & Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., supra note 5, at 
11-18. 
 52. Def.’s Comb. Mot. Summ. J. & Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., supra note 12, at 12. 
 53. Press Release, Internal Dept. of AG Emails Raise Questions about Motivation in Farmer Brown 
Case: Lawsuit Against Dan Brown and Gravelwood Farm a “Test Case” (Apr. 4, 2012), 
http://www.sourcewatch.org/images/f/f7/Food_for_Maine's_Future_Press_Release.pdf 
 54. Me. Const. art. VIII, pt. 2, § 1. 
 55. 30-A M.R.S.A. § 3001 (2011). 
 56. School Comm. v. Town of York, 626 A.2d 935, 938 n. 8 (Me. 1993) (citing the Report of the 
Joint Standing Committee on Local and County Government on the Revision of Title 30 11 (Dec. 
1986)). 
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In 2011, the towns of Sedgwick,57 Penobscot,58 and Blue Hill, Maine,59 each 
passed substantially similar versions of the Local Food and Self Governance 
Ordinance, purporting to exempt local food producers who sell directly to 
consumers from state and federal licensing and inspection requirements.60  The 
towns’ stated purpose in enacting the ordinance includes facilitating residents’ 
unimpeded access to local foods through farmers’ markets and direct farm-to-
consumer sales, and enhancing the local economy by promoting the production and 
purchase of local food products.61  The model ordinance’s preamble reads: 
We the People of [the municipality] have the right to produce, process, sell, 
purchase and consume local foods thus promoting self-reliance, the preservation of 
family farms, and local food traditions.  We recognize that family farms, 
sustainable agricultural practices, and food processing by individuals, families and 
non-corporate entities offers stability to our rural way of life by enhancing the 
economic, environmental, and social wealth of our community . . . .  We hold that 
federal and state regulations impede local food production and constitute a 
usurpation of our citizens’ right to food of their choice.62  
Given this language, it appears that these ordinances reflect fears within 
Maine’s farming communities that recent reinterpretations of state agriculture 
regulations, and possibly the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act,63 are tailored 
toward facilitating large-scale food production at the expense of the family farm 
and traditional agricultural values.64  The industrial food model fails to differentiate 
between family farms and factories, and imposes the same requirements on both.65  
Indeed, food sanitation laws seem to inherently require a producer to purchase 
expensive equipment.66  For large-scale agribusinesses like Tyson and Pilgrim’s 
Pride, these costs are a drop in the bucket.67  For small-scale producers like Dan 
                                                                                                     
 57. Sedgwick, Me., Local Food and Community Self-Governance Ordinance of 2011 (Mar. 5, 
2011), available at http://www.sedgwickmaine.org/images/stories/local-food-ordinance.pdf. [hereinafter 
Sedgwick Local Food Ordinance] 
 58. See Jennifer Kongs, Local Food Sovereignty Ordinance Passed in Maine Community, MOTHER 
EARTH NEWS (Apr. 12, 2011, 10:06 AM), http://www.motherearthnews.com/happy-homesteader/maine-
local-food-sovereignty-zb0z11zkon.aspx#axzz2JrrZkFAz. 
 59. Blue Hill Local Food Ordinance, supra note 11. 
 60. Jay Field, More Maine Towns Join “Food Sovereignty” Movement, ME. PUB. BROAD. 
NETWORK (Apr. 18, 2011), 
http://www.mpbn.net/News/MPBNNews/tabid/1159/ctl/ViewItem/mid/3762/ItemId/16037/Default.aspx
. As of the writing of this note, the number of Maine towns that have passed local food sovereignty 
ordinances has grown to eight. See Avery Yale Kamila, 2 More Maine Towns Pass Local Food 
Ordinances, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (June 14, 2012, 9:55 A.M.), 
http://www.pressherald.com/blogs/mainealacarte/159039265.html. 
 61. See, e.g, Model Local Food Ordinance, supra note 48, § 3; Sedgwick Local Food Ordinance, 
supra note 57, § 2; Blue Hill Local Food Ordinance, supra note 11, at § 3. 
 62. Model Local Food Ordinance, supra note 48, § 3. 
 63. FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885(codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
 64. See Alli Condra, Local Food and Community Self-Governance Ordinance, A.B.A. AGRIC. 
MGMT. COMM. NEWSLETTER (A.B.A./Smart Growth & Green Bldgs. Comm. & Agric. Mgmt. Comm.), 
Aug. 2012, at 17.  
 65. See WENDELL BERRY, BRINGING IT TO THE TABLE 37 (2009). 
 66. See id. at 83. 
 67. See SALATIN, supra note 43, at 23. 
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Brown, however, they are absolutely prohibitive.68  This inequity in food regulation 
has prompted at least one of those at the forefront of the food sovereignty 
movement to call the modern “doctrine of sanitation” the “greatest destroyer” of 
the small farm and small economies.69 
In addition to Maine’s home rule provision outlined in the State constitution, 
the ordinance finds statutory authority by which Maine “grants municipalities all 
powers necessary to protect the health, safety, and welfare of [its residents].”70  It 
also cites Maine’s statutory policy “to encourage food self-sufficiency for the 
State.”71  Thus, finding a cohesive purpose between the municipal ordinance and 
the State’s defined goals in regulating Maine’s food and agriculture, proponents 
maintain that this regulatory scheme inherently leaves room for the town’s Local 
Food Ordinance.72  Brown argues that the ordinance in fact facilitates the purposes 
of agricultural regulation by supporting the state and local economy, improving 
food quality and the health of Maine’s citizens, and ensuring the vitality of rural 
values and family farms.73  For those waving the banner of food choice rights, it is 
exactly these types of food sovereignty proclamations that foster the true purposes 
of food and agriculture.   
IV.  PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY 
Federal public health agencies have long warned of the dangers of raw milk 
consumption,74 and the FDA requires adequate pasteurization of all milk entering 
into interstate commerce.75  While the federal Grade “A” Pasteurized Milk 
Ordinance (PMO) sets the national standard for milk sanitation by defining 
acceptable practices in production, inspection, processing, and packaging,76 
intrastate sale or consumption of raw milk is a matter left to the states.77  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, a correlation has been suggested between state leniency toward raw 
milk and the occurrence of outbreaks and illnesses commonly attributable to raw 
milk and adulterated foods.78 
Significantly, in the Brown case, the State and the Department of Agriculture 
maintains that they do not seek to restrict Brown’s ability to sell raw milk.79  In 
                                                                                                     
 68. See BERRY, supra note 65, at 83-84. 
 69. Id. at 83. 
 70. Blue Hill Local Food Ordinance, supra note 11, § 4. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See Def.’s Comb. Mot. Summ. J. & Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., supra note 12, at 15.  
 73. Id. 
 74. See generally Raw Milk Misconceptions and the Danger of Raw Milk Consumption, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/Product-
SpecificInformation/MilkSafety/ConsumerInformationAboutMilkSafety/ucm247991.htm (last updated 
Nov. 1, 2011). 
 75. Milk and Cream, 38 Fed. Reg. 27924, 27924 (FDA Oct. 10, 1973).  
 76. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUB. HEALTH SERV. & FDA,., GRADE “A” PASTEURIZED 
MILK ORDINANCE iii (2009 Rev.).  
 77. Food Safety and Raw Milk, FDA, (Nov. 1, 2011), 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/Product-SpecificInformation/MilkSafety/ucm277854.htm. 
 78. See Adam J. Langer et al., Nonpasteurized Dairy Products, Disease Outbreaks, and State 
Laws—United States, 1993-2006, 18 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 385, 388 (2012). 
 79. Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Comb. Mot. Summ. J. & Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., supra note 5, at 5. 
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fact, Maine is one of twenty-five states that allow either the retail or farm-direct 
sale of raw milk from licensed food establishments.80  Rather, the State’s concern 
in this matter is in protecting the public health and welfare by ensuring that all milk 
sold to consumers—pasteurized or not—has been produced under safe, sanitary 
conditions, and is unadulterated and fit for consumption.81  The State ensures these 
safety measures within the food supply by way of Department licensing and 
inspection requirements, with which each food establishment must comply.82 
The State argues that allowing producers to sell milk and other food items 
completely unchecked would usurp the State’s compelling interest—indeed, the 
State’s responsibility—in protecting the health and welfare of its citizens.83  Such a 
hands-off approach to regulating the food supply would provide no assurance of 
sanitation in the production process, and would therefore pose serious public health 
consequences, including increased risks of food-borne bacterial, parasitic, and viral 
illnesses.84  The Department licensing and inspection requirements provide 
reasonable regulatory oversight to ensure that the food that ends up on our plates 
has been produced, processed, packaged, and labeled in a safe, sanitary manner.85   
The Blue Hill Ordinance, the State contends, is in direct conflict with the 
State’s purpose in ensuring an unadulterated food supply in Maine.86  By 
purporting to provide complete exemption from State agricultural regulations, and 
thereby allowing farmers who sell directly to consumers to bypass licensing and 
inspection requirements, the ordinance effectively frustrates the “efficient 
accomplishment” of a defined legislative purpose.87  The Department, under 
direction of the Legislature, established standards for inspection, licensing, 
labeling, and sanitation of milk products, in conformance with the standards set by 
the PMO.88  Thus, the State maintains, it is the express intent of the Legislature that 
the sale of milk and other food products are regulated in a manner consistent with 
FDA standards, thereby ensuring the reasonably unadulterated nature of Maine’s 
food supply through licensing, inspection, and enforcement of sanitation and safety 
measures.89  The State argues that by providing an exception to reasonable safety 
standards that does not exist in the state’s regulatory scheme, the Blue Hill Local 
Food Ordinance is implicitly preempted.90 
Furthermore, the State emphasizes that Department licensing requirements are 
not overly burdensome, and that the simple, affordable steps to obtain a license are 
                                                                                                     
 80. See Raw Milk Nation: State-by-State Review of Raw Milk Laws, FARM-TO-CONSUMER LEGAL 
DEFENSE FUND (May 17, 2010), http://www.farmtoconsumer.org/raw_milk_map.htm. 
 81. Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Comb. Mot. Summ. J. & Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., supra note 5, at 4-
5. 
 82. 22 M.R.S.A. § 2167 (2004 & Supp. 2012). 
 83. Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Comb. Mot. Summ. J. & Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., supra note 5, at 4-
5. 
 84. Id.. 
 85. Id. at 5. 
 86. Id. at 14. 
 87. Id. at 11-12. 
 88. Id. at 12. 
 89. Id. at 13. 
 90. Id. at 17. 
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accessible even for the small-scale farmer.91  Once licensed, a local food producer92 
is free to sell his products directly to consumers, provided sanitation and handling 
standards are maintained.93  In conformance with its stated purpose of protecting 
the family farm and rural values, the Department maintains it has a history of 
working cooperatively with producers to bring them into compliance with the 
law,94 and indeed offered such assistance to Brown prior to commencing legal 
action.95  Any hardships posed by the simple licensing procedure, the State 
continues, are certainly outweighed by public health concerns.96   
V.  ANALYSIS: FOOD RIGHTS VS. CONSUMER PROTECTION 
The Farmer Brown case raises some fascinating questions about the limits of 
local rule, the nature of agricultural legislative intent, and the merits of the “public 
safety” argument in opposition to municipal self-governance. 
There is a clear trend toward consumer’s demanding food localization and a 
relationship with the source of their food.97  There seems to be a growing sentiment 
that large-scale agribusiness and factory farms98 are simply not a sustainable, nor 
healthy model for global food supply.99  While few would argue that supporting 
local communities and agriculture is not worthwhile public policy, food safety is 
undoubtedly of tremendous policy concern.100 At its worst, a completely 
unregulated food supply could leave consumers at the whim of unchecked 
corruption and contribute to disease outbreaks of overwhelming proportion.  Then 
again, some argue that these are the exact crisis conditions imposed upon us by 
regulatory preference for large agribusiness.101 
The central issue102 in Brown comes down to whether the Local Food 
Ordinance in Blue Hill is preempted by Maine law and Department regulations.  
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, has provided a 
                                                                                                     
 91. See Id. at 5 n.1. 
 92. Local food distributors include “milk distributors,” see 7 M.R.S.A. § 2901-C(1) (2002), or “food 
establishment[s],” see 22 M.R.S.A. §§ 2152(4-A), 2167 (2004 & Supp. 2012). 
 93. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Comb. Mot. Summ. J. & Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., supra note 5, 
at 5. However, the comprehensive sanitation and safety requirements imposed upon a licensed producer 
are cited as insurmountable barriers for small, family farm operations in the form of exorbitant capital 
expenditures on sophisticated machinery.  See SALATIN, supra note 43, at 23; see also Isolde Raftery, 
Young Farmers Find Huge Obstacles to Getting Started, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/us/young-farmers-face-huge-obstacles-to-getting-
started.html?_r=3& (explaining that the cost of land and machinery, and limited access to capital, keeps 
many from taking up small farming operations). 
 94. See Pl.’s Statement of Add. Mat. Facts in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. 3, Brown, ELLSC-
CV-11-70 (Me. Super. Ct., Han. Cty., filed Nov. 3, 2011).  
 95. See Pl.’s Ex. E, supra note 7. 
 96. Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Comb. Mot. Summ. J. & Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., supra note 5, at 5. 
 97. See Coit, supra note 42, at 49-50. 
 98. See JONATHAN SAFRAN FOER, EATING ANIMALS 59 (2009) (suggesting that the term will no 
longer be in use as there will no longer be family farms to which to compare). 
 99. See id. at 148. 
 100. See Condra, supra note 64, at 17. 
 101. See generally FOER, supra note 98, at 135-43. 
 102. Brown also involves issues of estoppel and substantial compliance, which are outside the scope 
of this Note. 
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framework for interpreting the interplay between state law and municipal 
ordinances in light of Maine’s home rule provisions.103  The Law Court recognizes 
that local authority is “necessary for the welfare of the municipalities and their 
inhabitants,” and has affirmed that Maine’s home rule provisions establish a 
“rebuttable presumption that [municipal ordinances] are valid.”104  Accordingly, 
only where the Legislature has expressly denied localities the power of self-
governance over regulatory subject matter, or has clearly intended to exclusively 
occupy the field to the exclusion of the municipality’s home rule authority, will a 
local ordinance be invalid.105  Because there seems to be no explicit statutory denial 
of municipalities’ authority to regulate local agriculture, the preemption question 
turns upon whether the Legislature in fact intended to exclusively regulate 
agriculture to the implicit exclusion of local power.106  Therefore, if the Blue Hill 
Ordinance frustrates the purpose of agricultural regulation,107 it would not be a 
valid assertion of local authority in this context.108   
So, as a preliminary question: does the food sovereignty ordinance circumvent 
regulations designed to conform all intrastate food production and supply to state 
sanitation and safety standards?  The answer is likely “yes.”  The State has an 
undeniable interest in “the preservation of public peace, health and safety,”109 and 
in establishing reasonable measures to minimize the risk of consumer deception 
and widespread disease.  As a reasonable means toward these ends, the clear 
purpose of Maine law is to regulate the production and sale of food products “in a 
manner consistent with inspection and examination, licensing, permitting, testing, 
labeling and sanitation standards set by the [FDA].”110  The ordinance attempts to 
provide local food producers an unambiguous loophole to these requirements, and 
thus frustrates that purpose.   
However, the preemption analysis does not end there.  After all, what is the 
purpose of agriculture and food regulation?  Is it just conformity with state safety 
standards?  Or is that a simplification of the issue? 
Maine recognizes that safety is in fact not the sole concern in agricultural 
regulation, as exemplified in its stated intent under Title 7 of the Maine Revised 
Statutes, the title concerning agriculture and animals: 
[A]griculture . . . [contributes] substantially to the state's overall economy, [is] 
essential to the maintenance and strengthening of rural life and values and 
necessary to the preservation of the health, safety and welfare of all of the people 
of this State. 
                                                                                                     
 103. See Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Town of Lebanon, 571 A.2d 1189 (Me. 1990); School Comm., 626 
A.2d 935 (Me. 1993). 
 104. Cent. Me. Power, 571 A.2d at 1193.  
 105. School Comm., 626 A.2d at 939. 
 106. See id. 
 107. See E. Perry Iron & Metal Co. v. City of Portland, 2008 ME 10, ¶ 15, 941 A.2d 457, 462 (citing 
Sawyer Envtl. Recovery Facilities, Inc. v. Town of Hampden, 2000 ME 179, ¶ 27, 760 A.2d 257, 263-
64)  
 108. Condra, supra note 64, at 17. 
 109. Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Comb. Mot. Summ. J. & Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., supra note 5, at 
13. 
 110. Id. 
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The survival of the family farm is of special concern to the people of the State, and 
the ability of the family farm to prosper, while producing an abundance of high 
quality food and fiber, deserves a place of high priority in the determination of 
public policy.111 
In a very real sense, agricultural regulations define the state’s view as to what 
constitutes an ideal food system.  The manner in which we regulate our food supply 
has a direct impact on the role of agriculture in shaping our communities, our 
values, and our relationship to food.  As the Legislature has acknowledged, 
agriculture itself, and the role of the small, family farm should be a significant 
consideration in Maine’s food law and policy.112   
Indeed, Brown is not a case about the legality of raw milk, despite the Superior 
Court’s emphasis on the State’s apparent intent to subject dairy to more exacting 
standards.  But it is a case that has significant implications for food choice.  
Modern food regulation, and its prohibitive effect upon the small-scale producer, 
directly impacts the consumer’s “opportunity for qualitative choice.”113  The Local 
Food Ordinance is an assertion by rural Mainers that the option to buy food from 
their neighbors, thereby boosting the local economy and sustaining local family 
farms, is fundamental to their welfare and way of life.114  It is an assertion that the 
way we have been doing things is not working; that existing food regulation and 
the ideal role of agriculture and food are at odds with one another.115  The failure of 
the industrial food model to differentiate between the family farm and the factory 
farm necessitates the former’s opting out of that model. 
Thus, the Superior Court could have properly found that the purpose of 
agricultural regulation is not simply for the food supply—including dairy 
products—to conform to state guidelines for sanitation and safety, but also to 
preserve the traditional role of agriculture in rural communities, sustain the family 
farm, and boost local economies.  In so finding, the court may determine that, 
despite the loophole it provides to state licensing and inspection requirements, the 
ordinance does not frustrate the purposes for agricultural regulation because 
agricultural public policy goals should not yield to state-defined safety standards.  
Rather, both sound public policy and legislative intent dictate that proper 
agricultural regulation should promote these values harmoniously.  Arguably, there 
has been a tilt toward sacrificing public policy goals in the name of consumer 
protection.116  The Local Food Ordinance represents a locality’s attempt to reassert 
the established policy goals of agricultural regulation by exempting the family farm 
and direct farm-to-consumer sales from the industrial food model.   
But, are public safety concerns nonetheless paramount to agricultural public 
policy and concerns for the valuable role of small-scale food systems?  Are the two 
inevitably at odds? 
                                                                                                     
 111. 7 M.R.S.A. § 1-A (2002 & Supp. 2012). 
 112. See id. 
 113. See BERRY, supra note 65, at 35. 
 114. See Model Local Food Ordinance, supra note 48, § 3.  
 115. See id. 
 116. See BERRY, supra note 65, at 84-85.  See generally GUMPERT, supra note 23, at xxvi-xxix 
(describing the conflict that exists between private food choice and government concerns for consumer 
protection). 
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The State maintains that, absent any Department oversight, Brown would be 
free to sell his food products completely unchecked, with no assurance that the 
food was fit for consumption.117  The ordinance, however, does provide for some 
level of accountability.118  One of the philosophical tenets of the food choice 
movement is that it encourages an individual to see where his or her food comes 
from, and then judge the quality and safety of the product.119  This “free market” 
check upon local food producers may seem naïve but, whether stamped with FDA 
approval or not, any time we make a purchase decision on food, we take a risk.120  
It is the right of choice itself that is held as a fundamental liberty—the ability to 
determine for one’s self the quality, safety, and integrity of the food he or she 
consumes, rather than complete reliance upon state-approved sustenance.  
Agricultural policy that encourages consumers to literally see where their food 
comes from, and witness the health of the animals and the cleanliness of the 
facilities, undoubtedly has some merit.  This is particularly true as it becomes 
increasingly difficult to ignore the arguments by some that modern agricultural 
practices are endangering us far more than they are keeping us safe.121  Public 
safety is undoubtedly a substantial state concern, but the soundness of policies that 
commission the expanding role of factory farms and Concentrated Animal Feeding 
Operations122 in our food supply—where even “Best Management Practices”123 
facilitate alarming rates of food-borne illnesses,124 promote the growth of 
devastating “superbugs” like MRSA, H1N1 and H5N1,125 and constitute the 
leading contributor to greenhouse gasses126—must be questioned.127  Proactive 
measures taken by federal and state agriculture departments in the name of public 
protection seem to only exacerbate the dangers lurking in our food supply.128  It 
comes as little surprise, then, that an increasing number of “health and medical 
authorities are questioning whether the ever-widening use of sanitation techniques, 
including pasteurization, irradiation, [and] the overuse of antibiotics . . . could be 
                                                                                                     
 117. Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Comb. Mot. Summ. J. & Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., supra note 5, at 
14. 
 118. See, e.g., Model Local Food Ordinance, supra note 48, § 6.2.  Blue Hill, however, has not, as of 
the writing of this Note, proposed any alternative local regulations to ensure residents’ safety.  See 
Condra, supra note 64.  The Superior Court is unlikely to recognize the “free market” safety-check 
discussed in this Note as a viable alternative to safety regulation, and is therefore unlikely to uphold the 
ordinance on these grounds alone.  See id.  
 119. See Model Local Food Ordinance, supra note 48, § 3. 
 120. See GUMPERT, supra note 23, at xxvii-xxviii.  See generally SARAH A. LISTER & GEOFFREY S. 
BECKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40916, FOOD SAFETY: FOODBORNE ILLNESSES AND SELECTED 
RECALLS OF FDA-REGULATED FOODS (2010) (describing several methods and means of monitoring 
foodborne illness, as well as the rates and impacts of foodborne illness in the United States); Foodborne 
Outbreak Online Database (FOOD), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://wwwn.cdc.gov/foodborneoutbreaks (last visited Oct. 14, 2012) (supplying a web-based search 
tool for tracking national information on foodborne illnesses and disease outbreaks). 
 121. See generally FOER, supra note 98, at 135-43. 
 122. See id. at 50. 
 123. SALATIN, supra note 43, at 173. 
 124. See FOER, supra note 98, at 139. 
 125. See id. at 139-43; GUMPERT, supra note 23, at xxviii . 
 126. See id. at 58. 
 127. See BERRY, supra note 65, at 84-85. 
 128. See id. at 85; GUMPERT, supra note 23, at xxviii. 
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eliminating beneficial bacteria that not only keep pathogens at bay but also boost 
the nutritional value of foods.”129 
Of course, at issue in Brown was not the soundness of existing food regulation, 
but whether existing food regulation fairly anticipates municipal authority over 
local food commerce.  Significantly, Blue Hill’s Local Food Ordinance asserts that 
local food systems promote the availability of foods that are safer, healthier, and 
more nourishing than those produced by large-scale operations.130  In this respect, 
the ordinance shares and advances the State’s goals to provide quality nutrition in 
furtherance of the public health and welfare.131  Accordingly, the ordinance does 
not frustrate, but rather furthers the purpose of the State’s food regulations.  
Perhaps then, the court’s finding that the Legislature intends to promote public 
safety by way of dairy regulation to the implicit exclusion of localities ignores the 
notion of safety, in its purest sense, as well as the intended purpose of home rule 
provisions: to ensure the welfare of municipalities and their inhabitants.132 
The mere fact that the ordinance provides for an undeniably divergent, more 
liberal means of achieving the purposes of agricultural regulation does not preclude 
an argument against preemption,133 nor does the State’s argument that Department 
licensing and inspection requirements are not unreasonable or overly 
burdensome.134  Even if this latter argument is accepted as meritorious, it misses 
the point.  The question is not whether State licensing requirements are overly 
burdensome upon the small farmer, but whether the Legislature fairly anticipates a 
municipality allowing its farmers to sell food products without following such 
procedures.  The question in Brown, then, is not whether the existing regulatory 
scheme is fully consistent with and facilitates the intended purposes of agriculture, 
but whether the ordinance achieves these goals.   
Maine’s home rule legislation apparently grants broad local authority.135  
Given this broad grant of municipal power over local issues, Maine courts should 
                                                                                                     
 129. GUMPERT, supra note 23, at xxviii.  
 130. See Model Local Food Ordinance, supra note 48, § 3. 
 131. Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Comb. Mot. Summ. J. & Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., supra note 5, at 5. 
 132. See 30-A M.R.S.A. § 2109 (2011) (stating that the statute outlining Maine’s home rule, “being 
necessary for the welfare of the municipalities and their inhabitants” is to be construed “liberally”). 
 133. See School Comm., 626 A.2d at 941 (quoting Report of the Joint Standing Committee on Local 
and County Government on the Revision of Title 30 8 (Dec. 1986) (“The mere fact that there is a state 
law, or even a multitude of state laws on a subject is by itself irrelevant; the key is whether the 
Legislature intended to exclusively occupy the field and thereby deny a municipality's home rule 
authority to act in the same area.”). 
 134. Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Comb. Mot. Summ. J. & Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., supra note 5, at 5.  
See also Alli Condra, Maine’s Local Food Ordinances Tested, Nov. 21, 2011, FOOD SAFETY NEWS, 
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2011/11/maines-local-food-ordinances-tested. 
 135. See 30-A M.R.S.A. §§ 3001(1)-(3), which reads: 
1.  Liberal construction.  This section, being necessary for the welfare of the 
municipalities and their inhabitants, shall be liberally construed to effect its purposes. 
2.  Presumption of authority.  There is a rebuttable presumption that any ordinance 
enacted under this section is a valid exercise of a municipality's home rule authority. 
3.  Standard of preemption.  The Legislature shall not be held to have implicitly denied 
any power granted to municipalities under this section unless the municipal ordinance in 
question would frustrate the purpose of any state law. 
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narrowly interpret the current standard of implied preemption136—the question of 
whether the local rule frustrates a purpose of state law—and find no such 
preemption when the municipal rule aims at the same general purpose as the State’s 
statutory scheme, or otherwise provides for the satisfaction of any affirmative 
obligations upon the municipality itself.137   
In Brown, there is no indication that Blue Hill’s Local Food Ordinance is at 
odds with the general purposes of Maine’s agriculture regulation, as discussed in 
this section.  The Ordinance explicitly aims to ensure the vitality of the family 
farm, increase access to quality nutrition in furtherance of the public health and 
welfare, and strengthen the local and state economies.138  Furthermore, there seems 
to be nothing in the record to suggest that Blue Hill has not met any statutory duties 
imposed upon it in enacting a local agricultural ordinance.  Blue Hill is specifically 
authorized to enact local ordinances related to agriculture, provided that it submit 
the proposed ordinance to the Department for its review on whether the ordinance 
meets the Department’s “best management practices.”139  Significantly, this review 
process “does not affect municipal authority to enact ordinances.”140   
In light of the foregoing analysis, the Superior Court could have upheld the 
validity of the Blue Hill’s Local Food Ordinance to the extent necessary to allow 
the municipality to determine which agricultural practices promote the welfare and 
safety of its residents and foster the sustainability of its local agricultural practices 
and economy.  The family farm and the direct farm-to-consumer relationship is a 
segment of our food system worth preserving.  To the extent that a municipality 
finds existing state or federal food regulations restrictive of small-scale local food 
production and direct farm-to-consumer sales, that municipality should be allowed 
to exempt its local farmers from such regulation.  Food and agriculture, with their 
tangible and unique roles in local economies and rural values, seem to be precise 
areas of governance contemplated by home rule provisions as within the purview of 
local rule.  A municipal rule regarding direct farm-to-consumer transactions that 
are purely local in nature does not frustrate the State’s ability to regulate those 
producers otherwise falling under the “food establishment” or “milk producer” 
umbrella.  Thus, a holding that the Local Food Ordinance is not implicitly 
preempted by agricultural legislation would have both preserved the integrity of 
home rule authority and promoted the intended purposes of agricultural legislation.   
                                                                                                     
 136. See Shane Wright, Case Note, Smith v. Town of Pittston:  Municipal Home Rule’s Narrow 
Escape from the Morass of Implicit Preemption, 57 ME. L. REV. 613, 639 (2005). 
 137. See id. at 636. 
 138. See Model Local Food Ordinance, supra note 48, § 3. 
 139. 7 M.R.S.A. § 155 (Supp. 2012).  Although both parties to the Brown litigation appear to agree 
that Blue Hill is statutorily authorized to enact local agricultural ordinances, they appear to disagree on 
whether the Department has merely an advisory role regarding an ordinance’s conformity with the 
Department’s best management practices under 7 M.R.S.A. § 155, or whether a local ordinance will be 
implicitly preempted upon the Department’s determination that best management practices are restricted 
or prohibited by the ordinance. Compare Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Comb. Mot. Summ. J. & Opp’n to Pl.’s 
Mot. Summ. J., supra note 5, at 14 n.6, with Def.’s Comb. Mot. Summ. J. & Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. Summ. 
J., supra note 12, at 14-15.  The plain language of the statute, and the significance of home rule 
authority, seems to support the former interpretation. 
 140. 7 M.R.S.A. § 155. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Brown presents a fairly minute matter in the grand scheme of food law and 
policy.  It is a case about a single town in rural Maine that wishes to allow its small 
farmers to sell directly to consumers.  But, at the risk of exaggerating the potential 
ramifications of the Brown decision and order, this case could prove to offer an 
important glimpse into the legal and policy reasoning that shapes Maine’s 
agricultural model.  While the Superior Court did not expressly strike down the 
Blue Hill Ordinance, the ruling does put Maine farmers operating under local food 
ordinances on uncertain legal ground. Further, from a policy perspective, the 
ultimate disposition of Brown may reflect the true driving forces of food regulation, 
and firmly define the role of agriculture in Maine’s values and culture.  The court 
may very well have determined that striking a reasonable balance between freedom 
of food choice and consumer protection was impossible, and the side with which 
the court aligned likely turned upon the extent to which the multiple purposes of 
agriculture took precedence.  Perhaps, by focusing on the apparent legislative intent 
for heightened restrictions regarding dairy products, the Superior Court did not give 
proper weight to the significant role of food and agriculture in rural farming 
communities and local economies.  Or perhaps the court simply decided that public 
health and safety would be compromised without comprehensive regulatory 
oversight.   
In any case, given the facts before the court, and the express statutory 
language, summary judgment in favor of the State was appropriate.  However, had 
the court incorporated into its analysis the broader context of Maine’s agricultural 
regulation and the purposes for such regulation, it could have found Brown’s 
conduct shielded by home rule. At the very least, the Superior Court’s ruling 
signals that there is significant work to be done at the legislative level regarding 
Maine’s food system.  
  
